We study optimal pricing of roads and public transport in presence of nonlinear income taxation. Individuals are heterogeneous in unobservable earning ability. Optimal transport taris depend on time costs of travel and work schedule adjustments (days and hours worked per day) as a response to commuting costs. We nd that discounts for low income individuals are optimal only if the time cost of a trip is small enough. Lower travel time costs facilitate screening: therefore, redistribution provides an additional motive for congestion pricing. Finally, we investigate the desirability of means-testing of transport taris.
Introduction
It is often argued that prices on urban transport networks should reect social costs of travel.
For instance, as roads suer from congestion externalities, economic theory suggests that road pricing can increase eciency. Clearly, this may also have an impact on the distribution of welfare across society. Indeed, policymakers often care about redistribution when designing taris for publicly provided transport infrastructure. Concerns of a possible regressive eect recently impeded the introduction of road pricing in New York City and Paris.
1 Plans for a road pricing scheme in San Francisco include a tari discount to low income drivers, while discounted public transport fares are often granted to people qualifying for certain criteria, including income. Moreover, governments often subsidize commuting expenditures (e.g. through tax exemptions) for reasons that include helping disadvantaged workers.
Economic literature has looked at redistributive issues in pricing of transportation infrastructure (see Small and Verhoef (2007) for a comprehensive review). However, it has done so (with an important exception discussed below) ignoring the presence of income taxation.
This leaves open the question of whether such concerns are actually relevant, as they could possibly be addressed with appropriately designed income taxes. The main objective of this paper is to study such a question.
We consider the problem of a welfare-maximizing government that designs both income taxes and taris for roads and public transportation.
2 Individuals are heterogeneous in (exogenous) earning ability, which is assumed to be private information, as is their labor supply. Thus, the government faces self-selection constraints that may limit welfare redistribution.
To keep the setup as simple as possible, we use a model with only two types of individuals (à la Stiglitz (1982) ).
It is well-established that nonlinear taris are a crucial ingredient of ecient pricing policies in network industries (Wilson (1993) ). They are drawing increasing interest also in transportation, although their potential redistributive role (recognized in other regulated industries, e.g. energy or telecommunications) has not been explored.
mentable (at least at reasonable costs).
government is constrained to use linear taris.
Previous public nance literature has studied how (if at all) a government that can use income taxes should deviate, due to distributional concerns, from correcting market failures (Cremer et al. (1998) , Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) , Kaplow (2006) ). However, it has disregarded two relevant features for transportation, which are central in our analysis. The rst is that consumption of transport goods requires travel time. Boadway and Gahvari (2006) and Gahvari (2007) consider time of consumption in an optimal redistributive taxation framework. They do not consider externalities.
5 Mayeres and Proost (1997) study optimal redistributive taxation in the presence of congestion externalities, but restrict attention to linear taxes. Our approach is complementary, since it does not assume restrictions on the design of income taxes (it is constrained only by the available information).
A second key feature of our setup is that we explicitly model the relation between travel and labor supply. Individuals can decide the number of days at the workplace (which require commuting) and the length of their working day (or their daily eort). This can be interpreted as the choice between jobs oering dierent time schedules. For instance, one may choose a job with a four-days-a-week schedule or a ve-days-a-week one but requiring shorter daily shifts. Intuitively, increased commuting costs encourage, all else equal, to choose the former.
if individuals can adjust daily hours, increasing the cost of commuting does not necessarily result in lower labor supply. This has important implications for optimal transport taris.
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We show, to begin, that transport pricing has a redistributive role even in the presence of nonlinear income taxation. It can be used to improve screening of types, relaxing the self selection constraints. 9 In our setup, individuals face a trade-o when deciding on their work schedule. On the one hand, commuting less often saves time spent on travel. On the other, it requires (at constant income) to increase workday length and, hence, total hours worked. This is because when people work more hours per day, (average) hourly productivity is reduced. Our ndings suggest, roughly speaking, that if this reduction is large (resp. small) compared to the time cost of a trip on a given mode, it is optimal to have low ability individuals pay a smaller (resp. larger) tari to use that mode. The reason is that low ability types have less free time than high ability mimickers. Hence, encouraging low types to commute more often (via a lower tari ) improves their welfare more than that of mimickers only if the benet in terms of reduced labor supply outweighs the additional time spent on travel. It is only in that case that lowering the tari intended for low ability types relaxes self-selection constraints. To put it dierently, our results suggest that, for a given transport mode, discounted taris for low income individuals are optimal if and only if the time cost of travel on that mode is small enough. If travel by public transport is more time-consuming than car travel, this suggests that "social" taris and discounts for low income households may be more eective, in redistributive terms, when concerning cars than public transportation.
The above implies that individuals of dierent earning ability should not pay the same tari for a given transport mode. Hence, nonlinear taris are necessary to implement the second-best allocation (constrained, that is, only by self-selection). However, as mentioned above, the government may also face additional information constraints: it may only be able to observe aggregate trip quantities (anonymous transactions). In that case, only linear taris are implementable. Even so, the trade-o described above is a key determinant of optimal prices. In essence, the optimal (linear) tari for a given mode tends to increase with travel time cost, but decreases with the extent of productivity losses when commuting is discouraged and more daily hours induced.
Furthermore, dierent value of time for individuals of dierent ability (at a given quan-8 It is quite intuitive that the costs of commuting have an impact on labor supply. However, there exists some empirical evidence (Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010)) suggesting this impact is small.
Since further research is needed to corroborate or qualify these results, the assumptions on which our analysis is based look reasonable.
9 This is true in spite of the fact that individuals' preferences are separable in goods and leisure. In the absence of time costs of travel and of diminishing returns in daily hours, separability would make distributive concerns irrelevant when designing pricing of transport infrastructure (Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) ). tity of goods and income) implies that screening of types can be sharpened by reducing the time costs of journeys. Hence, curbing road congestion may also make redistribution more eective. This gives an additional motive to raise car taris for all types. Interestingly, a redistribution-minded government has, therefore, an additional reason to implement congestion pricing. This is in line with the results of Kreiner and Verdelin (2012) , who focus on provision of public goods.
As the anecdotal evidence mentioned above shows, there are concerns that transport taris that closely follow marginal social costs of travel may be hurtful to the poor. The government may thus want to dierentiate them based on income, introducing means-testing.
The suitability of means-testing for urban transportation is part of the current policy debate (see, e.g. Estupinan et al. (2007) ). The results we obtained suggest that, when nonlinear taris can be implemented, individuals of dierent income should not pay the same per-trip tari.
10 However, this does not necessarily imply that individuals diering in income should be oered dierent tari schedules (i.e., that transport taris should be means-tested). In the last part of the paper, we turn our attention to such a question. We show that when modal split, in the second-best allocation, is such that high income individuals commute more by car than low income ones and public transport trips have larger time costs than car trips, transport taris can be independent of income. That is, under a reasonable condition, individuals of dierent income can be oered the same tari schedules and means-testing avoided. We conduct some numerical simulations in the nal section of the paper. We nd only very few counterexamples in which implementability with separable tax and tari functions cannot be achieved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. We present optimal taris in Section 3. Section 4 considers implementation and means-testing. Section 5 presents some numerical illustrations of the results. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of all propositions are provided in an Appendix.
10 The results described above are obtained under the assumption that the government uses a general tax-and-pricing function, based on income and trip quantities. This means that optimal transport taris should, a priori, be conditional on income. Income taxes may also have to be conditional on travel quantities.
Note also that if the government is constrained to use linear taris, it is because individual trip quantities are unobservable and all transactions are anonymous. In that case, tari dierentiation is never incentivecompatible.
2 The model
Setup
We consider a population composed of two types of individuals i = 1, 2. They dier in earning ability (a measure of their productivity at work), identied by the parameter w i , with w 2 > w 1 . The size of group i is denoted π i , with i=1,2 π i = 1.
There are ve goods in the economy: composite consumption C (the numeraire), (peakhour) trips by car D and public transportation B, leisure x and labor supply L. The production technology is linear in labor, with constant marginal costs normalized to one, for C and D. The production sector is perfectly competitive. The marginal cost of a public transport trip, sustained by the government (assumed to be the provider of the service), is constant and equal to c B .
A trip by car or public transport requires a j j = D, B units of time, for all individuals.
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We ignore heterogeneity in location: hence, all trips cover the same distance. We assume the time spent consuming C to be a (perfect) substitute for leisure. Thus, contrary to time on travel and at work, it has no opportunity cost (see Boadway and Gahvari (2006) 
Sux i stands for individual quantities, which may vary depending on the individual's type.
We normalize the time endowment to one (same for all types). To capture road congestion, we assume that a D is an increasing and convex function of the aggregate amount of car trips.
Congestion on public transport is ignored for simplicity: it would make the optimal tari formulae more complicated without adding much to the results. Therefore
and a B is xed, withD = i=1,2 π i D i denoting the total level of road trac. We assume also that a D is taken as given when deciding how many car trips to take, which generates a congestion externality.
Individuals choose the amount of labor supply deciding on two key parameters: N , the number of working days, and h, the amount of hours worked per day on-the-job. Labor supply is thus L = N · h. This represents the choice between jobs oering dierent workdayshours schedules. For example, the individual may have the choice between a job oering a four-days-a-week schedule but requiring longer daily shifts (e.g. start early or nish late) or one with a ve-days-a-week schedule but with shorter daily shifts. Moreover, h may also be 11 Transport trips can be seen as activities obtained combining goods and time. We assume a xedproportions household production technology, as in, e.g., Kleven (2004) , so our formulation is consistent with that representation.
interpreted as a measure of eort provided (for a given number of hours) per day on the job.
All individuals are assumed to be commuters and to use the transport network only for this purpose (which we consider a reasonable simplication given our focus on peak-hour travel, for which commuting is a dominant contributor). A day at the workplace requires a return commuting trip, on one of the two modes. Therefore:
income is obtained as
where, importantly f > 0, f < 0. 
where
is the inverse of f (.). Therefore g > 0, g > 0. As may already be understood, diminishing returns generate an important trade-o when deciding on the work and travel schedule. If an individual travels one more day to work, she has to sustain the monetary and time costs of a commuting trip.
On the other hand, doing so allows, for given income, to reduce total labor supply. This is because hours per day are reduced and average hourly productivity goes up. We will see below that such a trade-o has important implications for the optimal tari schemes.
All individuals have the same utility function
Note the separability between leisure and goods. In the absence of time costs of travel and of diminishing returns on hours worked per day, this would yield the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) result of redundancy of marginal taris (except for pigouvian ones). However, in our model this result does not hold. We assume Ω (.) and φ (.) to be increasing and concave. As for γ (.), it may be increasing or decreasing in D and B. Transport trips, though necessary for commuting, may provide some utility to the individual (which could be interpreted as an additional purpose of the trip, such as escorting kids to school, i.e. trip chaining), or disutility (e.g. stress). In this we follow Parry and Bento (2001) 13 We begin by rewriting the utility function of a given type in terms of 12 Urban road pricing schemes usually involve the use of electronic systems allowing to track each car's access to the tolled road. As for public transportation, many cities have adopted the use of smart cards (e.g.
the Oyster Card in London or the Passe Navigo in Paris) which require personal registration and allow to keep track of trips taken.
13 As for C, with observable income, if transport trips are observable then individual's consumption level is observable as well.
observable quantities. We also saturate the time constraint and replace for x, so
U i is type-specic since, for a given allocation, it depends on w i . We proceed as if the government directly chose allocations, for each type of individual, of C, D, B and I. This follows the Taxation Principle (Stiglitz (1982) ). The government's problem is
(where R is an exogenous revenue requirement) and, assuming only one self selection constraint is relevant (this is a reasonable assumption in a two-type setup like ours)
is the utility of a high ability type mimicking a low ability one. Constraint (2) tells us that the optimal allocations designed by the government have to be such that individuals of high earning ability do not chose the bundle (of income, travel quantities and consumption) intended for low ability ones. Note that when mimicking, an high ability type will need to work less while earning the same income and consuming the same amount of C, D and B as the type she mimics. In this framework, mimickers commute to work the same number of days as the mimicked, but provide less hours of work per day (or daily eort).
To implement the optimal allocation, the government sets nonlinear taris for the trans- 14 We assume, without loss of generality, that good C is untaxed. The 14 This is a slight abuse of notation, since they are part of nonlinear schedules, which, a priori, depend on Lagrangian of the government's problem is
The rst order conditions of this problem are provided in the Appendix.
It is useful to illustrate the adjustment in labor supply induced by a marginal change in the number of workdays (i.e. commuting trips). For a given type, the latter writes as
Note that m i < 0 due to convexity of g(.). Given that hours per day at the workplace have diminishing returns, marginally increasing the number of commuting days (i.e. trips) brings the individual, for a given income, to reduce total labor supply. This is an interesting feature of our model, that comes from the fact that we allow the choice not only of working days, but also of daily labor supply. We have also
as the adjustment for the individual of type 2 mimicking an individual of type 1. It is easy to see that m 1 < m 21 < 0, as w 2 > w 1 . Given their smaller daily eort, mimickers can substitute hours worked for days at the workplace suering smaller productivity losses than low skilled types. This has relevant implications for optimal taris.
Benchmark
As a benchmark, consider the ideal case in which the government observes w, L, or both. Then λ = 0. The optimal per-trip taris are
Let us begin from taris for car trips t D : they should consist simply of a Pigouvian tax. Their only component is τ D , the marginal external cost of a trip. This is given by the increase all quantities observed. For instance
The general tax function may also include lump-sum tax/transfers, as well as xed components of transport taris (e.g. the xed part of a two part tari ). 15 Taris for public transportation t B should be equal to the marginal cost of providing the trip, c B . Thus, in the presence of optimal income taxation, and if self selection constraints are not relevant, optimal tari schedules should not deviate from the marginal social cost of a trip. This is because the government can use dierentiated lump sum taxes to redistribute welfare and cover the eventual xed costs of service provision.
Optimal marginal taris with binding self-selection constraints
Consider now the case in which w and L are unobservable and the self selection constraint binds, so λ > 0. The following holds.
PROPOSITION 1: When nonlinear transport taris are feasible, the optimal per-trip taris for cars and public transport t
For both cars and public transport, marginal tari formulae are dierent than in the benchmark case. They contain additional incentive terms, whose role is to improve screening of types (in spite of leisure-goods separability in preferences). Their presence depends on travel being time consuming and (partially) complementary to labor supply, due to diminishing returns in daily hours. valuable, at the margin, than for a low ability individual (all else given, the mimicker needs to work less and has more free time). Indeed,
As a consequence, the toll increase would hurt the low type less than the mimicker, if there was no change in labor supply. However, commuting less often (i.e. adopting a work schedule with less workdays, but of greater length, at given income) increases total labor supply. This is particularly true for low skilled types: their daily eort is larger than the mimicker's. Hence, they stand to lose more, in productivity terms, by having to further increase daily hours (recall that m 1 < m 21 < 0). The sign of z D depends on which of these two eects has the greater magnitude. If the increase in labor supply is higher (resp. lower) than the time cost of the trip itself, the tari raise hurts low ability types more (less) than high ability mimickers.
As a consequence, the self-selection constraint would be tightened (resp. relaxed). Loosely speaking, suppose (all else given) an additional workday lets the individual reduce total labor supply and the commuting trip by car is not too lengthy. Then, it is optimal to have low skill individuals pay a smaller marginal tari for car trips than high skill types (and vice-versa).
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The formulae for t D also contain two non-type specic terms. The rst is the τ D pigouvian term described above. The second is η D : this is strictly positive and accounts for how a reduction in road congestion can foster screening of types. The reason is that a marginal reduction in a D is always going to benet low ability individuals more than high ability mimickers, whose time is less valuable for them at the margin. Unlike in the benchmark case, the marginal external cost of a trip is not only the classic pigouvian one but has to include the extra cost of congestion in making redistribution less eective. The incentive eect of public goods (or bads, as in this case), in the presence of nonlinear income taxation, has been previously analyzed by Boadway and Keen (1993) , Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and, 16 It is not easy to say, a priori, which of the two eects above is of greater relevance. To x ideas, consider two extreme cases. Suppose, rst, that the time cost of a car trip were negligible, so a D → 0. Then, we would have z D < 0. Suppose, instead, that daily hours had constant returns, so that the length of the working day does not aect productivity (g = 0). As long as the time cost of a car trip is non-negligible, so a D > 0 , we would have z D > 0. more recently, Kreiner and Verdelin (2012) . However, in the setup of the rst two papers, this eect does not survive if individuals have separable preferences for goods and leisure, which we assume. Kreiner and Verdelin pointed out that such an eect exists as long as there is positive correlation between an individual's ability and her willingness to pay for a public good, at a given income and consumption bundle. This is indeed the case here since individuals have to allocate time to labor, leisure and travel. By relaxing the time constraint at the individual level, reductions in road congestion benet more mimicked than mimickers. This is interesting from a policy perspective because it means that redistribution provides an additional motive to raise taris (for all types), in order to curb network congestion.
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It is also interesting to note that the optimal marginal tari for high ability types is strictly higher than a standard pigouvian tax. Note, also, that η D is larger the more low ability types commute by car, D
1 .
18
Finally, we can look at public transport taris t B : marginal taris for low ability types t 1 B also carry the component z B , whose nature is similar to z D discussed above. Except, of course, that the relevant time cost of a trip is a B . It is however interesting to note that the formulae for z j only dier in the per trip time cost a j . Hence, the extent to which the government wants, for redistributive reasons, to encourage low income individuals to use of a given mode (by lowering the marginal tari they face) is generally larger the smaller the time cost of travel on that mode. Hence, if travel by car is less costly in time terms than by public transport (assuming the distance to be traveled is invariant), it is more desirable to discount taris for cars than for public transport.
Optimal linear transport taris
Let us now consider the case in which individual trip quantities are not observable and all transactions are anonymous. Then, the government has to design a mixed tax system with nonlinear income taxes and linear taris for transportation.
17 A similar eect would be observed if we allowed the government also to control investment in infrastructure: as long as greater network capacity allows, all else given, to reduce travel times, its provision can also produce a positive redistributive eect.
18 Previous analyses of transport pricing with redistributive concerns (see, e.g., Mayeres and Proost (1997)) have suggested that (linear) taris on a given mode should be higher when the mode is used to a large extent by high income individuals. In our model, this does not apply. High income (and ability) types pay, with respect to the pigouvian tax, a premium which is higher the more low income types use cars. Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that high ability/income types should be charged more, for a trip, than low ability/income ones.
We proceed, following Cremer et al. (1998) , under the assumption that the government designs an optimal revelation mechanism consisting of a set of type-specic before-tax incomes (note that the utility function U i (C, D, B, y, I) is type specic because, at a given allocation, it depends on w i ) subject to the budget constraint
We denote the resulting conditional demand functions as
i again, demands are type specic (given q, y i , I i ) since utility depend on w i . We denote the (type-specic) indirect utility function as
1 as demands and indirect utility function for a mimicker. Once again, given the presence of only two types in our setup, we can safely focus only on cases in which high ability types want to mimick low ability ones. The government's problem is
It is convenient to solve this problem assuming that the government also decides on the amount of road congestionD.
subject to the budget constraint i=1,2
and the self-selection constraint
we still denote by µ and λ the Lagrange multipliers for these constraints. The solution to this problem is presented in the Appendix.
Benchmark
With no self-selection constraints binding, so λ = 0, optimal taris are
/∂y i and t B = c B . As in the previous section, they have no redistributive role. PROPOSITION 2: When the government is constrained to use linear transport taris, the optimal taris t j j = D, B satisfy the following
whereD i andB i denote hicksian demands for, respectively, car and public transport travel. χ is a feedback term that stands for the net eect of a change in prices on the demand for car trips, after accounting for the change in road congestion. A single mode example Consider the case in which cars are the only travel mode (we could focus on public transport with similar outcomes). Then the optimal tari is simply
In such a simplied setup, the budget constraint of mimicker and mimicked is the same. The only dierence between them, at a given (D 0 , C 0 ) couple, is the I/w ratio (and, given this, the number of daily work hours). Thus, whether a mimicker drives more than a mimicked depends simply on whether her indierence curves in the (D, C) plane are atter than those of a mimicked. That is
at a given allocation. The slope of an indierence curve, computed at a given allocation
taking the derivative of σ with respect to I/w, one obtains
The sign depends on the trade-o between days at the workplace and commuting trips that drives the dierence between marginal taris when nonlinear pricing is feasible (see term z j in Proposition 1). Indeed, when the time cost of a commuting trip is larger (resp. smaller) than the reduction in labor supply with more day on-the-job, then ∂σ ∂(I/w) < 0 (resp. > 0).
Since the sign of ∂σ ∂(I/w)
is not immediately determined, it is once again useful to look at two extreme cases. Suppose that the time cost of a trip were negligible, so a D → 0 while f < 0 (and g > 0) . In that case,
Moreover, if a low ability type drives more than a mimicker, the incentive term in ε is will certainly be positive. Suppose, instead, that hours worked per day had constant returns, so f = g = 0, and the time cost of a car trip were non-negligible, a D > 0 . In that case, m would be equal to zero, so σ (D, C; I 1 /w 2 ) > σ (D, C; I 1 /w 1 ) and t D > ε.
Telework
The model presented above can easily be adapted to consider telework (i.e. work done outside the standard workplace, e.g. at home), with little impact on the results. It is generally recognized that telework has the potential to ease the pressure on transport networks in peak hours, by reducing travel demand. However, it may also lead to lower productivity than work done while physically on the job, as coordination with colleagues and supervisors (or supervisees) is more dicult. Also, monitoring of work safety and data protection is more complicated.
If indeed there is a productivity penality for telework, one more day at the workplace, for given income, reduces total labor supply. However, it requires a time-consuming commuting trip. Whether commuting should thus be more or less encouraged than for high ability ones depends on a trade-o that is essentially the same as in the case of choice of workday lenght.
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This is why, in terms of optimal pricing schedules (in the presence of optimal income taxes), the results would not dier from those derived above. 
Implementation of optimal tax and tari schedules
The question we investigate now is whether means-testing is a useful tool for a redistributionminded government designing both transport taris and income taxes. This responds to some questions raised in the policy debate on reforming transport pricing (see the Introduction).
If only linear taris are feasible and all transactions anonymous, the question is moot. This is why we focus on the case in which the government can use nonlinear tari schedules.
In Section 3.1, we have assumed that the government implements the second-best alloca- 22 If such a thing is feasible, then transport taris do not need to be means-tested.
The government looks to implement the second-best allocation
that solves the problem presented in Section 3.1, using the functions T (I) and P (D, B). T i and P i i = 1, 2 denote respectively the payments of income taxes and transport taris for individuals of type 1 and 2. Therefore
Incentive compatibility of the tax and tari schedules calls for types 1 and 2 to choose quantities and payments
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The setup of our problem is similar to that of Cremer and Gahvari. Our results are dierent. The reason is that, even with separable preferences, consumption of transport trips aects the marginal utility of leisure. This makes implementation with separable functions more dicult to achieve, as labor supply (and income) and consumption decisions cannot be separated. In addition, we do not assume any dierence in tastes between individuals of dierent ability. Finally, our problem is of greater complexity due to the presence of two goods that the government has to price. 
The rst two ensure that an individual of type i will not, while choosing the number of transport trips intended for his type, choose income level intended for the other type (partial mimicking on income). The second set of constraints ensures an individual of type i , while choosing the income intended for his type, will not mimick the other on transport trips. The solution of this problem is provided in the Appendix.
We now provide a sucient condition under which using separable functions T (I) and P (D, B) is enough to implement A SB . As long as the condition holds, means-testing is not required. PROPOSITION 3: Assume that the government wanted to implement the second best allocation A SB using a separate payment schedule for income T (I) and transportation P (D, B) . Then a sucient condition for A SB to be implementable is that it satises
The condition requires that high ability/income households travel more, but their total travel time is smaller than for the others. This can be the case if high income households commute more by cars than low income ones, while public transport trips have larger time costs than trips by car.
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In the numerical examples below, the condition given in Proposition 5 generally holds.
In fact, even when it fails, we nd no counterexample in which implementation with separable functions is unfeasible. We also go one step further. Instead of using functions T (I) and P (D, B) , we study whether implementation of A SB can be achieved by complementing the income tax schedule T (I) with two separate tari schedules, P (D) for cars and Q(B)
for public transportation. The theoretical problem is similar to the one presented above, but considerably more complex to solve. The volume of conditions to be checked would make treating the problem in an analytical way simply too tedious. This is why we only investigate the issue numerically. The results obtained seem to support the conclusion that implementation is feasible even using fully separable transport tari functions.
Numerical illustration
We present here a numerical example to illustrate the features of the optimal tari schemes derived above. We are also interested in verifying that conditions for implementability in separable functions, as discussed in Section 5, reasonably hold. In order to focus on these two aspects, we only look at the case of nonlinear tari schemes and consider xed network capacities. The examples are based on the following utility and daily productivity functions
and we assume that π i = δ i = endowment of time is normalized to one. We x the monetary cost of a car trip to one and set c B = 0.1 for a public transport trip. In each scenario, w 2 is set at 100 and we vary w 1 from 50 to 90. This produces dierences in earned income, at the second-best allocation, 23 Empirical evidence suggests that travel (and commuting) tend to be increasing in income. This is particularly true for car travel (Hu and Ruscher (2004) , Table 32 ). A modal split such that high income households travel more by car than low income households is, thus, not unlikely. Moreover, the UK Department for
Transport reports a value of time for a commuting trip by car, on average, which is about one third of that of a commuting trip by public transport (DfT (2011), Table 9 ).
that go from the low ability type earning about 25% to about 75% of the (pre-tax) income of the other type. For each scenario, we report individuals' earned income I i , their amount of travel on each mode and the optimal per-trip taris (all computed at the second-best allocation).
Concerning implementability, we refer to Condition I as implementability of the secondbest allocation using separable transport taris and income taxes, making use, possibly, of a joint payment schedule for cars and public transport. Condition II identies instead implementability using fully separable transport taris (i.e. separate payment schemes for cars and public transport), on top of a separate income tax schedule. For each scenario, we verify whether such conditions hold. Results suggest that implementability can be achieved in many circumstances, even when using three separate payment schedules for cars, public transport and income. Scenario 1. In the rst scenario, public transportation is a good alternative to cars. Good enough, in fact, to have both high and low income individuals make it their main commuting mode. This scenario may represent cities in which public transportation is very eective and the primary commuting mode for most of the population. Fitting examples might be European cities like Zurich and Stockholm. We can see that trip quantities are increasing with income, as individuals supply more labor and need to commute increasingly often. Note, in particular, that as her productivity increases, the low ability type works and commutes more, though always less than the high income type. Due to low road congestion, the pigouvian tax τ D on car trips is quite small (about 5% of the monetary cost of a car trip). The per-trip tari t 2 D is strictly higher than that (though by a small amount), while t 1 D is smaller. Low ability types pay the smaller per-trip tari also on public transport. This is because, at the margin, the cost (in terms of lower daily productivity) of reducing the amount of commuting is larger than the time cost of a journey, on both modes (see the expression for the term z in optimal taris of Proposition 1). However, the dierence between the marginal tari intended for high and low types is larger for cars than for public transport.
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This is due to the fact that public transport has higher time costs. Finally, considering implementability of the second-best allocation, the sucient condition of Proposition 5 fails.
Nonetheless, implementability is achievable using fully separable payment functions (i.e.
Condition I and II hold), in all cases considered. Once again, optimal per-trip taris are smaller when intended for low than for high ability types, with the dierence being larger for cars than for public transport. Implementability in separable functions is achievable in all the cases presented. The sucient condition of Proposition 5 holds, except in case w 1 = 50. In that case, however, it is impossible to implement the second-best allocation with separate tari schedules for cars and public transport (as long as they do not depend on income). Implementation is feasible, instead, if a joint transport tari scheme (independent of income) is used.
Scenario 3. In this scenario, public transport travel is signicantly more time consuming than car travel (time cost being more than ve times that of a car trip). Cars are thus the preferred mode by both high and low income households, except in the case in which low income ones earn (and work) much less than the others. This scenario seems consistent with the situation of many car-dependent cities. Fitting examples may be American ones such as Atlanta or Los Angeles. Note, however, that low income types commute to a much smaller extent than their high income counterparts. Optimal taris follow similar patterns as in Scenario 2, except that the pigouvian tax for cars is larger, given stronger road congestion.
As in Scenario 2, the sucient condition of Proposition 5 holds in all cases presented, except case w 1 = 50. Implementability of the second-best allocation is feasible using separate taris and income taxes. This is true except when w 1 = 50. In that case, a joint tari schedule for both transport modes (separate from the income tax schedule) is necessary.
Concluding remarks
Our ndings suggest that transport taris can, if properly designed, be used to improve the redistributive capabilities of the tax system. In a nutshell, this is because low ability types and high ability mimickers may have, at the same allocation, dierent values of time and changes in commuting costs aect their labor supply in dierent ways. This has led us to results which are perhaps counterintuitive, such as the fact that low income individuals may optimally have to pay higher (marginal) taris for using a given mode than high income individuals. Moreover, redistributive concerns may actually provide an additional justication for congestion pricing.
Our results rest, anyway, on some important assumptions. First, we have assumed that the income tax is optimally designed, which may not always be the case in reality. Yet, we have no reason to believe that the results would not stand even if the income tax schedule is suboptimal, as long as it can be exibly adjusted to account for changes in transportation policy (as in, e.g., Kaplow (2006) ).
Second, we have assumed that commuters can respond to increased travel costs by rais-ing daily work hours and ignored other margins of exibility, such as changing residence or shifting travel to o-peak hours (Arnott et al. (1993) ). Including the rst feature in the model would require modelling also the urban land market, which is out of our scope. Moreover, xed residence is often assumed in labor economics models studying commuting costs (Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010)). As for changes in travel times, while they would certainly add depth to the model, we can speculate that they would not signicantly aect our results. Indeed, a likely response by commuters to increased peak-hour travel costs (e.g. the introduction of a road toll) would be to leave home earlier and/or stay longer at work. Hence, an increase in commuting costs would increase daily and total labor supply (at given income, at least), as it is already the case in our model.
Finally, we have neglected the presence of multiple government levels (e.g. local and national ones), which may have dierent powers as well as divergent objectives.
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We plan, in future work, to extend our research study to incorporate these features.
We could consider the presence of an additional part of the population living outside the urban area.
Assuming these people do not use its transport network (so that they do not care for D and B), xed residential location, and that tax schedules are exible enough to be dierentiated between people belonging to a given urban agglomeration and those who do not, our results would not change. They would also not change with multiple urban areas and, again, income tax schedules may be dierentiated across them.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
The rst order conditions of this problem are
where subscripts denote partial derivatives, U i x ≡ φ i x is the marginal utility of pure leisure
x j = D, B denotes the marginal utility individual i = 1, 2 derives from a commuting trip j = D, B. This is net of the opportunity cost of trip time, as well as the induced adjustment in labor supply m, at a given income and goods bundle. Take (7), (9) and (11) and rearrange to get to 
Similarly, using (8), (10) and (12) we get
In the optimal allocation, we must have
Using these relations, we can obtain the marginal tari rates t i j provided in the Proposition.
We now focus on j = D and derive τ D and η D . Rewrite
now using (7) we have
and using (8) we have
nally, replacing the above expression in (15) for j = D and rearranging we have
where the terms τ D and η D as described in the text can be recognized (note that
. We now focus on z j j = D, B. We can write
the right hand side can also be written as
(by separability), the expression above becomes
which is z j j = D, B in the text.
Optimal income tax rates
Using (13) and (7) we obtain
now, using the fact that
we have
while, using (14) and (8), we have t
We solve this problem assuming that the government can directly determine the level of congestion (public bad), denotedD. When solving the problem, we have thus an additional equality constraint given byD = i=1,2 π i D i . We denote by β the Lagrange multiplier for this constraint. Thus, the Lagrangian is
The rst order condition of this problem are Finally, one needs to replace for β as obtained above and rearrange to obtain, from the last two expressions above, the optimal taris as expressed in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
We proceed assuming the following conditions hold at A 
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Proof of validity of (5) for i = 1 at A
SB
Rewrite the left hand side of (16) for i=2, using (2) (we know this constraint to be satised at equality since, by assumption, it constraint 26 Their meaning is the following: with I 2 w w > I 1 w 1 , we assume that the amount of labor supplied by the high ability type is larger than that of the low ability type. We also assume that both the pre-tax and the post-tax income of individuals of high ability is higher than that of low ability types.
27 Similarly, P 1 should be designed as the payment such that trip quantity D 1 + B 1 gives the same utility, to an individual of type 1 choosing to earn income I 1 , as making no trips at all. However choosing no travel at all would always be a dominated alternative, given their commuting purpose (with no commuting, labor supply would be innite) even if P 1 took away all of the individual's net income. We thus set P 1 arbitrarily.
This also means that we can be sure that neither individuals of type 1 nor those of type 2 will prefer zero trips to, respectively, D 1 + B 1 and D 2 + B 2 , as long as P 1 and P 2 are not unreasonably high.
